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INTRODUCTION
Federal preemption of state law is often considered to come at the cost
of Federalism values. Where some national interest is deemed important
enough, policymakers and scholars reason that state law and Federalism
principles like local democratic control or localized policy innovation must
give way to that overriding federal interest. 1 However, the federal judiciary
and Congress are also sensitive to the dramatic consequences of preemption
of state law, and this sensitivity has led to numerous carve-outs in federal
legislation2 as well as a canon of clear statement rules and presumptions
against preemption3 recognized in order to protect Federalism values.
Section 1044 of the 2011 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act4 is a creature of this historical suspicion of federal
preemption. It purports to weaken the powers of federal regulators to preempt
state law affecting national banks in an attempt to improve the rigor of
financial regulation in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, especially with
respect to consumer debt origination. While some have argued that Section
1044 plays an important role in protecting state consumer finance protection
1

See generally Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 208, 81 Stat. 485, 501
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543) (preempting state motor vehicle emissions and
fuel standards where less stringent than the federal standard so as to benefit the environment);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514(a), 88 Stat.
829, 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)) (establishing field preemption over
“any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan” so as to create a uniform set of rules for retirement plans nationwide); Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 (current version at 11 U.S.C.) (using federal
preemption to establish a uniform bankruptcy court system for the entire country, which,
unlike other instances of broad preemption commands, stems from the Constitution’s text
itself per U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”)).
2
See e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (defining “qualified domestic relations order”); I.R.C.
§ 414(p)(1)(A) (establishing qualified domestic relations orders as not preempted by
ERISA’s anti-assignment provisions); 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2) (establishing special
exemptions for California in light of its history of aggressive environmental protection
through strict fuel and emissions standards).
3
See e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“Congress legislated
here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”) (citations omitted); Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985) (“We also must presume that Congress
did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation.”) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992)
(“[W]e must construe these provisions in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of
state police power regulations.”).
4
12 U.S.C. § 25b.
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laws from wanton federal preemption, in reality Section 1044 upsets the
careful balance of state and federal interests within our Dual Banking system,
in which state and nationally chartered banks compete within their own
distinct regulatory environments.
The Federalism problems inherent to Section 1044 stem from its
deviations from our Dual Banking system—a system that inverts many of our
traditional assumptions about the supposed antagonism between preemption
and Federalism values. Instead of inherently threatening state interests,
federal preemption within the realm of Dual Banking maintains our distinct
federal and state banking regimes, as well as the Federalism values that Dual
Banking serves.
Viewed from this perspective, Section 1044 represents an unwise,
perhaps even reactionary turn towards the supremacy of state bank regulators
reminiscent of early constitutional disputes which led to cases like McCulloch
v. Maryland.5 This historical legacy is a far cry from the progressive
aspirations of Dodd-Frank as a whole, which speaks to the wandering
development of American banking law and the troubling implications of
Section 1044. From the very structure of our banking system, which has often
been described as “balkanized,” 6 to shifting policy preferences expressed by
Congress,7 the principles that undergird our federal banking regime often
seem to be anything but consistent or logical.
See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317–19 (1819) (detailing Maryland’s attempt to tax a federal
bank, which the Court ultimately found unconstitutional).
6
See e.g., Louise Bennetts, Regulatory Fragmentation, the Balkanization of Financial
Markets and the Competitiveness of the American Financial Services Sector, CATO INST.,
(Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.cato.org/publications/testimony/regulatory-fragmentation-bal
kanization-financial-markets-competitiveness [https://perma.cc/GBV6-U6VE] (discussing
“[t]he Costs of Regulatory Fragmentation within the United States” and “The Dangers of
Financial Sector ‘Balkanization’”); Jana Kasperkevic, Does the U.S. Have Too Many
Financial Regulators?, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/ 2018/
03/19/what-balkanization-fragmented-financial-regulatory-system/ [https://perma.cc/G98V6SYD] (“This ‘relative balkanization of the authorities was a major factor in why this crisis
was so bad and why the damage to the economy was so great,’ said Timothy Geithner, who
was the president of the New York Fed when the financial crisis began, and who later became
President Obama’s first Treasury secretary.”); Carter H. Golembe, Our Remarkable Banking
System, 53 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1967) (identifying the challenge “jurisdictional
conflicts” pose to both banks and regulators).
7
See e.g., Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (reversing
the long-held trend of prohibiting interstate bank branching, a policy that befuddles modern
banking experts); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (expanding the
power of thrifts to engage in general banking after the failure of thrifts during the savings
and loans crisis); Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 1, 38 Stat. 251, 251
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 221) (establishing a mixed private-public hybrid
5
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History suggests that this fragmented structure is the consequence of
the patchwork nature of federal banking legislation. Whereas most of the rest
of the world has opted for a unified structure for banking regulation with one
agency in charge,8 the United States relies on a number of agencies,
established primarily through individual organic statutes, to implement
cohesive financial policy by consensus. 9 This picture is complicated by the
fact that banking and financial regulation is also a state affair. Each state has
its own unique system of bank chartering, regulation, and supervision which
may or may not resemble the federal scheme. 10 This Dual Banking system11
is a unique part of “our Federalism,”12 and it is threatened by Section 1044.
By hampering the ability of federal regulators to preempt state law
affecting the operation of national banks, Section 1044 allows state regulators
to break down the Dual Banking system by enforcing state banking policy on
national banks, and, to a lesser extent, on banks chartered by other states. In
the process, Section 1044 threatens to deprive us of Federalism benefits
secured by our Dual Banking system such as policy innovation, democratic

structure for the Federal Reserve System). For the contradictory and confused reasoning that
motivated the structure of the federal reserve, see generally PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE
POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 23–24, 103–26 (2016).
8
Kasperkevic, supra note 6 (“‘I don’t know of another major country that has anything close
to it,’ Scott said. ‘For instance, to take England by comparison, they have a bank regulator and
one market regulator. That’s it. Japan, they have actually a single regulator of everything.’”).
9
E.g., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Reserve, the Treasury
Department, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
10
See State-Chartered Banks by State, CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS, (Sept. 13, 2019),
https://www.csbs.org/state-chartered-banks-state [https://perma.cc/ZZ7J-97U8] (suggesting
that some states may offer thrift or credit union charters in addition to bank charters, some may
offer only bank charters, some may centralize bank supervision in one entity or not, et cetera).
11
For an explanation of the Dual Banking system, see generally Julia Stackhouse, Why
America's Dual Banking System Matters, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, Sept. 19, 2017,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/september/americas-dual-banking-systemmatters [https://perma.cc/UG9F-6BSB].
12
One of the more timeless explanations of “Our Federalism” can be found in Justice Black’s
opinion in Younger v. Harris, which stresses that Federalism is more than just a state affair:
“Our Federalism” . . . does not mean blind deference to “States’ Rights”
any more than it means centralization of control over every important
issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected
both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests,
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States.
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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accountability, and political transparency. 13 However, the anti-federal
instincts behind Section 1044 are hardly a recent development, and in fact
date back to the early Republic. The classic example of skepticism toward
national banking is President Andrew Jackson’s message to the Senate upon
his veto of the bill that would have re-chartered the Second Bank of the
United States in July of 1832. 14 Putting aside his arguments that the bank was
blatantly unconstitutional, Jackson specifically argued that the bank was
controlled by and primarily benefited foreigners and foreign governments, that
it favored Eastern states over Western states, and that it was otherwise corrupt
and mismanaged.15 None of these criticisms made much sense on the merits,
especially given that Jackson’s veto left bank chartering entirely up to the
states, who were no less likely to have foreign investors, and did not have a
reputation for good management or clean books.16 Jackson’s veto was in fact
a manifestation of his distrust of federal banking institutions, a reactionary
turn against national “monied interests” and towards state institutions.17
A parallel can be drawn between Jackson’s sentiments and those
which motivated the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act18 in 2010. While Dodd-Frank has experienced
intense scrutiny from conservative figures, some of whom have argued that
it is unconstitutional,19 some of its provisions are startlingly conservative by
objective standards. It is not immediately clear how ending bailouts would
serve the goals of financial stability or aggressive, sound federal banking
regulation.20 Similarly, it is unclear how Dodd-Frank’s curtailment of federal
13

See infra Part III.
8 REG. DEB. app. 73–79 (1832).
15
Id. at 74–75.
16
The period which followed Jackson’s veto is fondly referred to as the years of “Wild Cat
Banking,” in which fraud seemed to be part and parcel of operating a state-chartered bank.
Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, Free Banking, Wildcat Banking, and Shinplasters,
FED. RSRV. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV., Fall 1982, at 10, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
research/qr/qr632.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW6X-6SCY].
17
8 REG. DEB. app. 79 (1832).
18
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The long form name of the Act is revealing: “An Act to promote
the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes.” Id. at 1376.
19
See e.g., C. Boyden Gray & Jim R. Purcell, Opinion, Why Dodd-Frank is Unconstitutional,
WALL ST. J. (Jun. 21, 2012, 6:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527
02304765304577480451892603234 [https://perma.cc/AHF4-H877] (arguing that the structure
of the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau violates constitutional separation of powers).
20
Indeed, much of the rest of the world regards bailouts as routine crisis measures. Luke
Frazza, The List: The World’s Biggest Bailouts, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 15, 2008, 12:00 AM),
14
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banking preemption authority under Section 1044 benefits the cause of sound
banking regulation and consumer protection. Much like Jackson’s veto,
Section 1044 represents an unwarranted policy preference for state regulators
and against their federal counterparts. In deviating from the Dual Banking
system generally, Dodd-Frank’s preemption provisions actually deprive our
banking system of many of the benefits that follow from Federalist principles.
The narrative which contributed to the passage of Section 1044,21 that
federal regulators were asleep at the wheel in 2008 and that excessive federal
preemption hamstrung state regulators that could have otherwise prevented
or lessened the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, is likely wrong for many of
the same reasons that Jackson’s faith in state-dominated banking was wrong.22
But more importantly, Dodd-Frank’s curtailment of federal banking
preemption authority undermines Federalism principles and in doing so defeats
the goal of an efficient, coherent, and state-inclusive banking scheme. 23
This paper argues that regardless of how much or what kind of
financial regulation is optimal, it should be enacted within the confines of our
Dual Banking system consistent with the principles that motivate our
Federalism. Part I details the practice and precedent of our Dual Banking
system as a part of our Federalism. Part II provides a recent history of federal
banking law and its departures from our Dual Banking system. Part III argues
that Federalism values would be better served by liberal federal preemption
standards for state laws affecting nationally chartered banks. Part IV argues that
Section 1044’s Skidmore instructions also threaten Federalism interests. This

https://foreignpolicy.com/2008/09/15/the-list-the-worlds-biggest-bailouts [https://perma.cc/
2FBP-DA27]. There may be an intuitive progressive flair to the goal of “ending bailouts,”
but there is also a laissez-faire dimension to the project, which betrays a hostility to
government intervention. See e.g., Steve Chapman, The Case Against the Bailout, REASON
(Sept. 25, 2008, 7:00 AM), https://reason.com/2008/09/25/the-case-against-the-bailout
[https://perma.cc/Q3XX-H5KN] (“Not only that, the more effective it is, the more damage
it will do to the free market system. Saving companies from their bad gambles turns business
into a game of ‘profits for me, losses for you,’ corroding the incentives that make capitalism
so innovative and efficient.”).
21
See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How the
Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2011) (“BarGill and Warren also alleged that the aggressive preemption of state consumer financial
protection laws by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‘OCC’) in the 2000s
weakened consumer financial protection at the state level.”).
22
See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Federal Preemption and Consumer
Financial Protection: Past and Future, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 25, 34 (2012)
(questioning whether consumer finance protection laws have any impact on financial stability).
23
Ultimately, this paper tries to be agnostic on the question of whether consumer finance
protection laws would or would not have prevented or lessened the impact of the 2008 financial
crisis. It is an irrelevant question, as consumer finance protection laws can be passed at the
federal level for national banks as well, consistent with our Dual Banking system.
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article concludes with an endorsement of improving federal regulation instead
of curtailing federal preemption in the area of consumer financial protection.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
While our Dual Banking system has not been a part of American
government for as many years as our Constitution has, it is nonetheless an
important part of our Federalist traditions. Indeed, many parts of the Dual
Banking system take on constitutional significance when expressed in federal
legislative commands under the Supremacy Clause, most commonly in order
to achieve parity between state and national banks in terms of their authorized
powers. This drive for competitive parity not only has a long history in the
Federal Congress and Judiciary,24 but also in a national consensus which
includes state legislatures. 25
A. Federal Legislative and Judicial Recognition
Our Dual Banking system has been an integral aspect of American
banking since the passage of the National Bank Acts of 1863 and 1864
(collectively, “National Bank Act”). Passed in the middle of the Civil War by
Radical Republicans, the National Bank Act was designed to establish a
national currency, raise war money, and establish nationally chartered
banks.26 Prior to the National Bank Act, bank chartering was essentially an
enterprise left to the states, much as corporate chartering is left to the states
today, at least for now.27 Potential applicants interested in opening a bank had
to apply to a state office in order to obtain a charter, and the state which
chartered that bank was responsible for its regulation, much in the same way that

24

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
26
See generally Kevin Dowd, "US Banking in the 'Free Banking' Period," in THE
EXPERIENCE OF FREE BANKING (Kevin Dowd ed., 1992) (summarizing the state of banking
immediately before the first and second National Banking Act (“NBA”)); Richard
Grossman, US Banking History, Civil War to World War II, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert
Whaples, ed., 2008), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/us-banking-history-civil-war-to-world-warii/ [https://perma.cc/S3H3-T2GW] (discussing the purposes behind the NBA, which were to
establish a national currency, raise war money and basically obliterate state charters).
27
Senator Warren has a plan to introduce mandatory federal charters for certain large U.S.
corporations which would limit their ability to engage in political activities and mandate
worker representation on corporate boards, among other things which surely would offend
the Delaware bar. Matthew Yglesias, Elizabeth Warren Has a Plan to Save Capitalism, VOX
(Aug. 15, 2018, 11:05 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17683022/elizabeth-warrenaccountable-capitalism-corporations [https://perma.cc/SY8J-JGAL].
25

316

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2020

the internal affairs doctrine excludes foreign states from regulating the internal
governance of a foreign corporation chartered by any other state today.28
After the passage of the National Bank Act, state-chartered banks or
prospective bank managers had the option to apply for national charters that
would subject them to federal regulation and supervision instead of state
oversight.29 Importantly, the Civil War Congresses actually expressed a
preference for national bank charters over state charters, limiting the
authority of states to tax nationally chartered banks in 1864,30 while
establishing a 10% tax on state bank notes, eliminating all state bank currency,
and generally encouraging state banks to acquire national charters in 1865.31
This preference for national charters would not last into the 20th Century.
From the postbellum period onwards, federal policy regarding state
charters softened, moving towards the goal of parity between state and federal
bank charters in order to allow equal competition between nationally and
state-chartered banks.32 This shift accelerated in the 20th Century. In 1927,
Congress passed the McFadden Act, specifically allowing nationally
chartered banks to branch within a state to the extent state-chartered banks in
that state could in order to achieve exact precision between national and state
banks within each state. 33 This measure was enacted in reaction to the rise in
28

See generally McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987) (applying the internal
affairs doctrine).
29
For information on the distinction between regulation and supervision, see Banking
Supervision, FED. RSRV. EDUC. https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/
structure-and-functions/banking-supervision [https://perma.cc/S6N4-PHX6] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2020). State-chartered banks retain the power to switch to a national charter today,
and vice versa for nationally chartered banks. See, e.g., Dan Ennis, OCC Signs Off on Fifth
Third's Switch to National Bank, BANKING DIVE (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.banking
dive.com/news/fifth-third-occ-national-bank-charter/562741 [https://perma.cc/WN2V-XLHY]
(detailing the OCC’s approval of a Cincinnati-based bank’s application for a national charter).
30
Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 111, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 548)
(limiting state taxation of nationally chartered banks); see also Samuel B. Chase, Jr., State
Taxation of Banks, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 149, 150 (1967) (noting that courts have
upheld federal power to determine a state’s ability to tax national banks).
31
FED. RSRV. BANK OF PHILA., THE STATE AND NATIONAL BANKING ERAS: A CHAPTER IN
THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKING 12 (2016), https://wayback.archive-it.org/8115/
20190122150741/https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/publications/economic-education/
state-and-national-banking-eras.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/YEA4-URFS].
32
Compare Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 681–83 (1988) (detailing the Congressional
desire to eliminate Dual Banking during the civil war), with E. A. GOLDENWEISER, IRA
CLERK, M. J. FLEMING, L. R. ROUNDS, E. L. SMEAD, FED. RSRV. COMMITTEE ON BRANCH,
GROUP, AND CHAIN BANKING, THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 1–16
(1930), (discussing the transition from the Civil War Period to the early 20th Century, during
which a “form of rivalry which has been described as a competition in laxity” emerged in
the Dual Banking system).
33
Ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228–29.
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expanded intrastate chartering authority of state banks. For most of American
history, banks were limited to one location. In interpreting the McFadden Act,
the Supreme Court itself noted the “competitive equality” that Congress seeks
to establish between state and nationally chartered banks, especially given the
“competitive tensions inherent in a dual banking structure where state and
national banks coexist.”34
Later, when some states began to allow interstate branching, the
Federal government acted again to restore parity to the Dual Banking system
by passing the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994.35 Again, Riegle-Neal respected parity within each state by only
granting the power to branch between states to national banks chartered in
those states in which state banks also had this authority.36
Another example of the importance that Congress places on parity is
deposit insurance, which today covers consumer bank deposits for all banks,
state and national, as of 1950. The Original Banking Act of 1933 did not
mandate that state-chartered banks acquire deposit insurance from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Company, but this was remedied with the Federal
Deposit Act of 1950. 37 More recently, in 1991, Section 24 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Improvement Act was passed to limit
the corporate powers of state-chartered, FDIC insured banks to those given
to nationally chartered banks. 38 Collectively, these examples suggest that
Congress has endorsed parity within our Dual Banking system by limiting or
expanding the power of national or state-chartered banks to ensure that one
would not overwhelm the other.
B. A National Consensus

First Nat’l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969); see also id. at 133 (“The policy
of competitive quality is therefore firmly embedded in the statutes governing the national
banking system.”).
35
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
36
See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (“A national banking association may, with the approval of the
Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of
the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and
operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in
question”) (emphasis added); 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(4)(A) (“An interstate merger transaction
may involve the acquisition of a branch of an insured bank without the acquisition of the
bank only if the law of the State in which the branch is located permits out-of-State banks to
acquire a branch of a bank in such State without acquiring the bank.”) (emphasis added).
37
See Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, § 5 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1)) (extending deposit insurance to almost all depository institutions,
state and national).
38
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
§303(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2349–53 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a)).
34
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This respect, and at times, demand for parity between national and
state banks has not been pursued by the federal government alone. Similarly,
state legislatures have acted through “wild card statutes,” which in effect
“grant[] state-chartered banks the power to engage in any activities permitted
for national banks.”39 The structure of these statutes varies immensely from
state to state, but regardless of their form they serve as a sign that the
federalist interests promoted by a competitive Dual Banking system are
favored both by the national and state governments.40 In fact, their “nearunanimous adoption” by state legislatures suggests that there is a national
consensus on the issue.41
In instances in which state governments have tried to directly impede
the powers of nationally chartered banks rather than establishing competitive
parity, in effect breaking the rules of our Dual Banking system, the Supreme
Court has ruled in favor of preemption. In Barnett Bank v. Nelson, the court
held that any state laws which “significantly interfere with the national bank's
exercise of its powers” are preempted by the original National Bank Act of
1863.42 In this case, Florida had made it illegal for banks of any kind to sell
insurance, a power which national legislation had granted to all nationally
chartered banks.43 The Supreme Court ruled that because the state law was in
clear conflict with the federal law authorizing the sale of insurance by
national banks, it was preempted. 44 The Barnett preemption standard has
since been interpreted to “hold a wide variety of state laws preempted.”45 This
is not to say that the Supreme Court was ratifying a national policy of hostility
to state banking preferences. Instead, it was confirming the power of the
federal government to determine the powers of its own banks, just as states
generally have over their own chartered institutions. This in effect forced
states to turn to the federal legislative process in order to limit the terms on

39

JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45081, BANKING LAW: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
PREEMPTION IN THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 8 (2018).
40
John J. Schroeder, “Duel” Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An Examination of
Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 36 IND. L. REV.
197, 202–08 (2003).
41
Id. at 200.
42
Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
43
Id. at 28–29 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 92 and FLA. STAT. § 626.988 (Supp. 1996) (repealed by
Laws 1999, c. 99-388, § 8, eff. July 1, 1999)).
44
See id. at 34 (“The Federal Statute before us, as in Franklin Nat. Bank, explicitly grants a
national bank an authorization, permission, or power.”). Interestingly, the court found that
the McCarran–Ferguson Act’s special state insurance law pre-emption standard under 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) did not apply because the federal law authorizing national banks to sell
insurance specifically related to the business of insurance. Id. at 38. This provision of the act
bears a functional similarity to Dodd-Frank’s OCC pre-emption standard under Section 1044.
45
SYKES, supra note 39, at “Summary.”

Vol. 6:2]

Anti-Federalist Banking Policy Under Dodd-Frank

319

which national bank charters could compete, consistent with our Dual
Banking system.

II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DUAL BANKING
This system of parity under Dual Banking continued until 2004,
according to proponents of Section 1044, when the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (“OCC”) published a final rule on preemption “clarifying the
applicability of state law to national banks.”46 This OCC rulemaking, they
argued, expanded the scope of federal preemption of state banking laws to
“create large holes in the regulatory fabric that encourage[d] lenders to use a
national charter to evade local protection.”47 These OCC rules48 were directly
responded to in Dodd-Frank in the form of Section 1044,49 which curtails the
preemption of state banking laws affecting nationally chartered banks.
A. The 2004 OCC Rules
The crucial language in the 2004 OCC Rules clarified that state laws
are preempted if they “obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s
exercise of its lending, deposit-taking, or other powers granted to it under
Federal law.”50 This left state laws in force over national banks only to the
extent that they had an “incidental” effect on “a national bank’s exercise of
its lending, deposit-taking, or other powers granted to it under Federal law.” 51
Critics alleged that this standard for preemption was akin to a kind of fieldpreemption52 which largely eviscerated, inter alia, state consumer lending
laws.53 Senator Elizabeth Warren, one of the chief architects of Dodd-Frank,
46

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL.
AND VISITORIAL POWERS: TWO FINAL RULES (2004).
47

NO. 2004-6, PREEMPTION

Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 83 (2008).
See infra Section II.A.
49
See infra Section II.B.
50
Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904,
1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34).
51
Id. at 1911–12.
52
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (“[T]he States are precluded from
regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined
must be regulated by its exclusive governance.”) (emphasis added) (discussing field
preemption as a form of preemption in which all state law governing an area is preempted
by federal law according to Congress’s wishes).
53
See generally Wook Bai Kim, Challenging the Roots of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis:
The OCC's Operating Subsidiaries Regulations and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 21 LOY.
48

320

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2020

and later a favored candidate for the first official director of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), was an early critic of this preemption
standard. In 2008 she suggested that the preemption standard enshrined in the
2004 rules was so broad that it could arguably render nationally chartered
banks “free to flaunt all state laws.”54
The OCC maintained that its new preemption rule was only intended
to “distill” the various preemption doctrines established by the Supreme
Court under the National Bank Act, not to expand upon them.55 It also
explicitly identified areas of state law that it did not believe the National Bank
Act generally preempted for national banks, including “contracts, collection
of debts, acquisition and transfer of property, taxation, zoning, crimes, torts,
and homestead rights.”56
Irrespective of the exact scope of the 2004 OCC rules, it is clear that
a great deal of state consumer finance protection laws were covered, and
critics allege that the sort of predatory loans which caused the 2008 financial
crisis would have been offered less frequently if the 2004 OCC rules had not
been promulgated.57 The extent to which state consumer finance protection
laws actually would have reduced the quantity of subprime mortgages securitized
CONSUMER L. REV. 278, 287 (2009) (“[T]he states' ability to enforce their consumer
protection laws was effectively eliminated and, in fact, a regime of de facto ‘field
preemption’ of the states' regulatory power has been created.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The
OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 228
(2004) (“[T]he OCC has deliberately crafted its rules to accomplish a sweeping preemption
of state laws that is equivalent to the ‘field preemption’ regime established by the Office of
Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) for federal savings associations and their operating
subsidiaries.”). But see Dori K. Bailey, A Defense of the Doctrine of Preemption: Revealing
the Fallacy That Federal Preemption Contributed to the Financial Crisis, 16 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1041, 1097–1103 (2014) (arguing that the preemption of state laws affecting loan
origination did not contribute to the 2008 crisis).
54
Elizabeth Warren, Banks: State Laws Not for Us, CREDIT SLIPS (May 6, 2008, 8:21 PM) https://
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/05/banks-state-law.html [https://perma.cc/ZY57- D2V7].
55
See SYKES, supra note 39, at 16 (“The OCC explained that it intended the phrase ‘obstruct,
impair, or condition’ to function as the distillation of the various preemption constructs
articulated by the Supreme Court . . . and not as a replacement construct that is in any way
inconsistent with those standards.” (internal quotation omitted)).
56
Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904,
1905 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34). This certainly implies that the 2004
OCC rules did not purport to preempt all state laws related to the business of banking.
57
See e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to
Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 897 (2011) (“Regulatory
inaction and preemption by federal banking agencies played a significant role in allowing
abusive nonprime lending to grow and spread during the past decade.”); LEI DING, ROBERTO
G. QUERCIA, CAROLINA REID & ALAN WHITE, CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, THE PREEMPTION
EFFECT: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAWS
ON THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 19 (2010) (“[P]reemption consistently increased the default
risk of privately securitized mortgages originated by the OCC lenders . . . .”).
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at the time of the 2008 financial crisis is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is
beyond dispute that subprime lending was a major factor in the crisis.58
B. Dodd-Frank’s Response
In 2010, Dodd-Frank made two targeted changes to the preemption
standards for state “consumer financial laws,” which are defined as state laws
“that do[] not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks and
that directly and specifically regulate[] the manner, content, or terms and
conditions of any financial transaction” of a “consumer.”59 First, Dodd-Frank
revised the scope of state laws affecting the operation of national banks
preempted under the National Bank Act. Second, Dodd-Frank mandated
courts to use Skidmore deference when evaluating rules promulgated by the
OCC which purport to preempt state law.
Section 1044 of Dodd-Frank set out three alternative criteria for the
preemption of state consumer financial protection laws. First, such a law
could be preempted if it had a “discriminatory effect on national banks, in
comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered by that State.” 60
This provision clearly displays an interest in the parity of state and national
bank charters, much in the same way that Riegle-Neil did with respect to
interstate branching.
Second, a state consumer finance protection law could be preempted
if “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption” established in
Barnett Bank, “the State consumer financial law prevents or significantly
interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers.”61 Clearly this
provision implies that Congress believed the 2004 OCC rules went beyond
the preemption standard established in Barnett Bank.62 Notably, this
provision also limited OCC determinations that a state law was preempted
under Dodd-Frank to case-by-case determinations, and only after
consultation with the newly created Consumer Finance Protection Bureau. 63
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES xxiii (2011) (“We conclude collapsing mortgage-lending standards and
58

the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis.”).
59
12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2).
60
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(A).
61
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B); see also Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996)
(providing the preemption standard).
62
Otherwise there would be no reason to revise the relevant preemption standard after the
2004 OCC rules.
63
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he term ‘case-by-case basis’ refers to a determination
pursuant to this section made by the Comptroller concerning the impact of a particular State
consumer financial law on any national bank . . . .”); 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(B) (“When
making a determination on a case-by-case basis that a State consumer financial law of
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Third, a state law could be preempted if it was preempted by federal
law outside of Title 62, in which Dodd-Frank is housed.64
If there was any doubt as to whether the Dodd-Frank preemption
standard would actually narrow the preemption powers of the OCC, cases
immediately following Dodd-Frank’s passage eliminated it. In 2011, a
federal court held in In Re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation that
national banks were not exempt from certain state “bad faith” tort actions that
related to the management of depository accounts.65 This holding was
especially notable because under OCC rules both before and after DoddFrank, state law concerning the management of checking accounts was
usually preempted.66 More recently in 2018, the Supreme Court denied cert
in Lusnak v. Bank of America, N.A., in which the 9th Circuit had held that
state laws requiring nationally chartered banks to pay interest on escrow
accounts were not preempted under Dodd-Frank’s preemption standards,
despite the fact that interest payments on deposits lie at the heart of banking
activity.67 Some commentators have suggested, however, that the Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to grant cert in that case may have had more to do with
certain Justices’ hostility to Chevron deference, rather than their opinions on
OCC preemption.68
Regardless of its precise effects, Section 1044 was clearly intended to
restrict the extent to which the OCC can allow national banks to operate
independent of state laws relating to consumer finance protection. In fact, the
original proposal for financial reform crafted by the Obama Administration
in June of 2009 would have “eliminated NBA preemption of state consumer
another State has substantively equivalent terms as one that the Comptroller is preempting,
the Comptroller shall first consult with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection . . . .”).
64
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(C).
65
See In Re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1320, 1322 (S.D.
Fla. 2011) (applying “the standard for preemption in the context of the NBA [as] provided
by an amendment to the NBA, found in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010”).
66
See Gregory D. Omer, Federal Banking Law Preemption in the Post-Dodd Frank World: A
Review of Significant Developments, BANKING L. COMM. J. (A.B.A., Chi., Ill.), Apr. 1, 2019,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/ban
k ing/2019/201904/fa_1/ [https://perma.cc/LH2S-MRUQ] (citing Bank Activities and
Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1916 (Jan. 13, 2004) and 12
C.F.R. 7.4007(b)(2) (2020)).
67
Lusnak v. Bank of Am., 883 F.3d 1185, 1194–97 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 567 (2018).
68
See Andrew Tauber, Reginald R. Goeke & David L. Beam, US Supreme Court Refuses to
Review Ninth Circuit Lusnak Decision Requiring National Banks to Abide by State Intereston-Escrow Laws, MAYER BROWN (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/
perspectives-events/publications/2018/11/us-supreme-court-refuses-to-review-ninth-circuit-i
[https://perma.cc/2HT9-M5R2] (suggesting that Lusnak, a decision “palpably wrong and
contrary to long-standing precedent governing a critical area of the economy,” was a prime
opportunity for the Supreme Court to limit Chevron deference).
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protection laws altogether.”69 This approach failed to gain traction in
Congress, and the codification of Barnett Bank’s preemption standard in
Section 1044 was ultimately proposed by then-representative Barney Frank
of Massachusetts.70
The second notable preemption provision in Section 1044 is the
command to courts to “assess the validity” of OCC preemption
determinations “depending upon the thoroughness evident in the
consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the
consistency with other valid determinations made by the agency, and other
factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant to its decision.” 71 This
language is directly lifted from Skidmore v. Swift & Co., a decision which
evaluated a federal agency’s interpretive rules for consistency with law
according to what is now called Skidmore deference.72 At a descriptive level,
mandating Skidmore deference as opposed to Chevron deference makes any
OCC rulemakings less likely to pass judicial review, as Skidmore review is
less deferential than Chevron review, which only requires that agency
interpretations of the statute be reasonable.73 At least one study has found that
agency interpretations reviewed under Skidmore are 21.4% less likely to
survive judicial scrutiny than those reviewed under Chevron deference.74
More importantly, what the command to use Skidmore deference
really entails is a radical departure from agency procedure as we know it
today.75 Courts reviewing OCC preemption determinations cannot defer to
the OCC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank or the National Bank Act. They must
decide each preemption question as a matter of law, effectively entrusting
each “case-by-case” preemption decision to the judiciary, with the hope that
the assigned judge is amenable to Dodd-Frank’s policy goals.

69

SYKES, supra note 39, at 19.
Id.
71
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A).
72
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that waiting time could
count as working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
73
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
74
See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1, 6 (2017) (“[A]gency interpretations were significantly more likely to prevail under Chevron
deference (77.4%) than Skidmore deference (56.0%) or, especially, de novo review (38.5%).”).
75
Section 1044’s hostility to Chevron deference is another area in which Dodd-Frank seems
comparatively conservative. Generally, limiting the reach of Chevron deference is associated
with conservative legal advocates. See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, High Court Could
Take First Step to Chevron Doctrine’s Demise, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 28, 2019, 4:56 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/high-court-could-take-first-step-to-chevrondoctrines-demise [https://perma.cc/E5C7-PM6P] (“Conservatives have increasingly
attacked [the Auer and Chevron] doctrines in service of a grander plan to curb the
administrative state.”).
70
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III. SECTION 1044’S INCONSISTENCIES WITH FEDERALISM AND DUAL
BANKING
It is important to note the kind of Federalism problem that Section
1044 presents. Formally, there is no purely constitutional issue with Section
1044. The federal government is generally free to curtail the degree to which
it authorizes its agencies to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause,
which establishes that federal law “made in [p]ursuance” of the Constitution
is “the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and.”76 This includes agency rulemakings as
authorized by federal law which express the intent of Congress as evaluated
under Chevron deference, or presumably other standards of administrative
review as instructed by Congress.77 Conversely, as long as the OCC’s 2004 rules
were a reasonable interpretation of the statutory authority accorded to the agency
under the National Bank Act, or later by Dodd-Frank, then they should be valid.
Alternatively, if the scope of the preemption afforded by the 2004 rules was too
broad to be a reasonable interpretation of Congress’s intent, then they should be
invalidated. At their core, these are all questions of statutory interpretation.
Other traditional constitutional Federalism disputes are also not
applicable here. The preemption that follows national bank charters does not
implicate the regulation of any traditional state functions by the federal
government,78 or federal funding requirements, 79 or the commandeering of
state officials or resources.80 The Federalism problem that arises here may be
unique, in that the extent to which state law is preempted depends on the
number of available and operating national bank charters, but this does not
seem like a distinction worthy of constitutional significance. Recent
76

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1442 (2008) (arguing that Chevron should not apply in full for purposes of the
Supremacy Clause because, strictly speaking, rulemakings are not federal law made in
pursuance of the Constitution).
78
See e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (discarding
the project of identifying “traditional governmental functions,” which are immune from
federal regulation).
79
See e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (holding that the
Medicaid expansion conditions under the Affordable Care Act were as coercive as “a gun to
the head”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (holding that the federal
government conditioning highway funding on states setting their legal drinking age to
twenty-one was not coercive).
80
See e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act was unconstitutional in part because it commandeered state and
local law enforcement officers to aid the federal government in enforcing background
checks); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (holding that the “take title”
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, which forced
certain states to take title to nuclear waste, constituted unconstitutional commandeering).
77
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challenges based on this observation that rely on the Tenth Amendment have
been largely ineffective in the Fintech context, where state banks and state
bank regulators have challenged special purpose national Fintech charters
made available to non-bank financial institutions, worrying the charters
would allow a broader market of financial companies to avoid state law
through federal preemption.81
The actual Federalism problem with Section 1044 is that it departs
from our Dual Banking system and the Federalism benefits that this system
guarantees. By empowering state banking agencies to regulate the banking
activities of federal banks, Section 1044 takes us towards more of a statecentered banking monoculture instead of a system predicated on parity
between state and nationally chartered banks that exist in distinct regulatory
spheres. While it may seem counterintuitive, federal preemption of state law
in this context actually serves the cause of Federalism by preserving
competition between state and national banks to promote financial
innovation82 and ensuring democratic accountability and political
transparency,83 which not only guarantees that banking policy will be
democratic, but also that it can evolve through productive national discourse.
Section 1044 is also unnecessary given that the structure of our
federal government protects states from encroachment by federal banking
regulators,84 states possess institutional clout with federal regulators 85
through which they can affect federal banking policy, and states have a
certain residuum of regulatory power due to some banks’ preference for local
regulators.86 In short, Section 1044 deprives us of Federalism benefits in a
policy area in which states are clearly capable of fending off Federal
encroachment on their own.
A. Competition and Policy Innovation
One of the most commonly cited benefits of our Federalism is the
experimentation and competition that it fosters between states, and in a Dual
Banking context these benefits also accrue to the state and federal banking
systems. As Larry Kramer said, states can compete on terms of “regulatory
innovation” for “capital and taxpayers.” 87 Or, as Justice Brandeis phrased it
81

See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conference of State Bank
Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 1:18-cv-02449, 2019 WL 4194541
(D.D.C. 2018) (listing the grievances that the CSBS has with the OCC’s Fintech charter).
82
See infra Section III.A.
83
See infra Section III.B.
84
See infra Section III.C.
85
See infra Section III.D.
86
See infra Section III.E
87
Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499 (1994).
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in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, states may “serve as a laboratory . . .
without risk to the rest of the country.”88
The problem with Section 1044’s three preemption conditions is that
they reduce the extent to which competition can occur both between state and
federally chartered banks, as well as between different state banks. National
charters are already a clear minority in the grand scheme of our banking
system, with the FDIC reporting 7,214 OCC charters as of November 27,
2020, compared to 17,341 state-chartered banking institutions. 89 By
subjecting all nationally chartered banks to “a litany of consumer protection
rules that vary from state to state,” 90 Dodd-Frank may ultimately reduce the
attractiveness of federal charters or encourage consolidation in order to
spread the cost of regulatory compliance, undermining the goal of charter
competition in terms of parity.91
Limiting the preemptive effect of the NBA also threatens to
compromise charter competition as between states, as occurred in Madden v.
Midland Funding, a post Dodd-Frank case from the Second Circuit in which
the court held that “federal preemption of state usury laws under the National
Banking Act does not extend to certain entities holding debt originated by
national banks.”92 These entities include many third party holders of debt
originated by national banks, reducing the ability of national banks to
originate and sell debt effectively. 93 One of the principal benefits of the NBA
is that it limits the effect of state laws on the “business of banking,” including
loan origination, to those laws passed by the state in which a state bank is
chartered, “allow[ing] lenders and borrowers to avoid time-consuming
investigation of each state’s usury laws by ensuring that a lender generally
need only consider the usury law that governs in the state listed on its
88

285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
Institution Directory: Current List of All Institutions, FDIC, (Nov. 27, 2020),
https://www7.fdic.gov/idasp/warp_download_all.asp [https://perma.cc/7PFP-7B2R].
90
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 47, at 83.
91
See Avner Mendelson, Survival Strategy: Cut the Number of Banks in Half, AM. BANKER:
BANKTHINK (Jan. 30, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/survivalstrategy-cut-the-number-of-banks-in-half [https://perma.cc/DFY3-3R32 ] (noting the rising
rate of consolidation of banks over the last two decades). See generally RON FELDMAN &
PAUL SCHRECK, FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ASSESSING COMMUNITY BANK
CONSOLIDATION (2014), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/pubs/eppapers/141/epp_14-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8U8-7PH3] (examining research that suggests that
increased regulatory burdens after the financial crisis have accelerated the consolidation of
community banks).
92
See Michael Marvin, Interest Exportation and Preemption: Madden’s Impact on National
Banks, the Secondary Credit Market, and P2P Lending, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1807, 1807
(2016); Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying the
“significantly interfere” standard from Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)).
93
See Marvin, supra note 92, at 1814 (“These new transaction costs imposed by Madden are
particularly high because remedies for usury law violations also vary among states.”).
89
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charter.”94 This is especially reasonable given the large variance in state usury
limits, which can vary from 25% to 8% without much reason across state
lines, but the number of state laws affecting the “business of banking” which
could hamper efficient interstate banking are too numerous to mention. 95
Liberal preemption standards are necessary in order to allow both national
and state-chartered banks to compete on equal terms with other state banks,
which makes both systems more efficient and allows for local policy
variation and innovation.
This reality is reflected both in the history of intra and interstate
branching, in which state banks pressed the national government and the
governments of their sister states to modernize their banking systems to allow
more liberal branching.96 It continues in the wide diversity of regulatory
regimes which govern each state charter system. For instance, while at the
federal level, and in most states, charters may be obtained for credit unions,
thrifts and regular bank institutions, some states such as Delaware and
Wyoming do not offer credit union charters. 97 Many states, such as
Pennsylvania and New Jersey consolidate chartering and supervision of all
of their depository institutions in one state agency, whereas at the federal
level they are dispersed. 98 Even now, the federal government is
94

Id. The effect of this part of the NBA is similar to the Delaware internal affairs doctrine.
See e.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 218–19 (Del. 1987) (applying the internal
affairs doctrine to limit the effect of non-Delaware law on the Delaware corporation in question).
95
Marvin, supra note 92, at 1816.
96
See supra Section I.A.
97
SUNSET ADVISORY COMM’N, SUNSET HEARING MATERIAL 9 (2008), https://web.archive.org/
web/20081030022451/http://www.sunset.state.tx.us/81streports/cud/cud_hm.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VDD2-B6YF].
98
The Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities is responsible for approving
charter applications for Pennsylvania state-chartered banks. See 7 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1005,
1007 (2020) (describing the application process for Pennsylvania state charter applicants).
The state legislature also gave it the power to “exercise . . . discretionary powers,”
“promulgat[e] . . . rules and regulations,” and “examin[e] and supervis[e]” depository
institutions. 7 PA. CONS. STAT. § 103(b) (2020). See also 7 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 112, 115,
1604, 1605, 1703, 1808 (2020) (authorizing various supervisory and regulatory powers for
the Department). The New Jersey Department of Banking & Insurance is also responsible
for approving charter applications for depository institutions chartered by the state of New
Jersey, as well as supervising those institutions. See N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 17:9A-9, 17:12B14, 17:12B-246 (2020) (setting out the charter application requirements for New Jersey
chartered depository institutions); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:9-43 (2020) (establishing the
examination, supervisory and regulatory authority of the Commissioner of the New Jersey
Department of Banking & Insurance). Compare these schemes with the federal one, which
features a multitude of regulators. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is
responsible for the chartering of National Banks and Federal Savings Associations. 12 U.S.C.
§§ 21, 1464. The National Credit Union Administration charters federal credit unions. 12
U.S.C. § 1759. But the number of regulators, examiners, and supervisors that oversee these
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experimenting with the establishment of new “Fintech” charters in order to
extend financial supervision into the “shadow banking” industry, which has
evaded most regulation and supervision since 2008. 99
All of this experimentation has not been fruitless. States have taken a
particularly rigorous role in promoting the development of financial services,
inspiring our modern form of checking accounts, branching, real estate
lending, deposit insurance (a policy whose invention is usually attributed to
the federal government), and trust services, which have since been emulated
by the banks of sister states and national banks.100
B. Democratic Accountability and Political Discourse
Another source of conflict between Section 1044’s preemption
provisions and Federalism principles is their tendency to erode democratic
accountability. Just as when “the Federal Government compels States to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished,”101 when the federal government allows state regulators to set
policy for national banks, or other state banks, it becomes unclear which
government is responsible for that action. Granted, our system of financial
regulation is already hopelessly complex, but that does not mean that we
should not work towards something better. A world in which the public can
better understand and take action to reform national or state financial
institutions is a world in which more reform would likely occur. The federalist
institutions includes the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the National Credit
Union Administration themselves as well as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Consumer Finance Protection
Bureau to name a few. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES
WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 7–16 (2017). For
a sympathetic view of this regulatory diversity and more detail on the federal financial
regulatory landscape, see Lawrence J. White, In Defense of Regulatory Diversity, MONEY &
BANKING (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2017/10/14/indefense-of-regulatory-diversity [https://perma.cc/85NL-ZHWF].
99
See Todd H. Baker, Charter or Not, Fintechs Are Already ‘Banking’, AMERICAN BANKER:
BANKTHINK (Nov. 22, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/charteror-not-fintechs-are-already-banking [https://perma.cc/3CF4-Z7PH] (discussing Fintech
charters and whether “inviting fintech, along with other types of parallel and shadow banking
entities, into the regulated banking system—rather than pushing them away—is the right
policy outcome to manage systemic risks”).
100
Schroeder, supra note 40, at 201 (citing Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State
Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System,
58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1156 (1990)).
101
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (discussing how the
commandeering of the State of New York per the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act reduced the accountability of the Federal government by allowing it to act
through New York).
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principles of democratic accountability underlying the holding in New York v.
United States with respect to the anti-commandeering principle apply in full
force here, even if Section 1044 does not constitute commandeering.102
Limiting the application of state banking law to the banks chartered
by a given state also serves the discursive benefits of Federalism by
facilitating “‘dissenting by deciding,’ giving political outliers an opportunity
to force engagement, set the national agenda,” and “offer a real-life
instantiation of their views.”103 Clear examples of this kind of dissenting by
deciding include the early adoption of depository insurance by eight states—
Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, Mississippi, North
Dakota, and Washington after the panic of 1907—decades before the national
government established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 104 These
programs were all the more notable because they initially put their statechartered institutions at a competitive disadvantage because of insurance
costs, which their less scrupulous sister states and national bank competitors
did not have to pay. These states eventually won the national conversation
when the federal government acted after the Great Depression to establish the
FDIC.105 It is unclear whether the national government would have taken this
action without the living case studies of these early adopters.
Another good example of the discursive benefits of Federalism
leading to concrete national change is the national evolution of branching
previously mentioned in this paper. 106 The McFadden and later acts were
clear federal responses to aggressive state reforms which forced the hand of
the national government into partially legalizing intra and interstate
branching, in fear that their charters and other state charters would become
obsolete.107 While this change may appear a banal economic reform to most,
the development of complex branching in America was revolutionary, and
vigorously opposed by entrenched skeptics of banking who often harbored
102

Id.
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J.
1889, 1895 (2014).
104
Eugene Nelson White, State-Sponsored Insurance of Bank Deposits in the United States,
1907–1929, 41 J. ECON. HIST., 537, 537–38 (1981).
105
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 12B(a), 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933) (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a)).
106
See supra Section I.A.
107
See generally Gary Richardson, Daniel Park, Alejandro Komai & Michael Gou,
McFadden Act of 1927, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY, (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.
federalreservehistory.org/essays/mcfadden_act [https://perma.cc/3TRP-JV2Z] (discussing
the history of the McFadden Act); Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, Constituencies
and Legislation: The Fight Over The McFadden Act Of 1927, at 2 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 17266, 2011) (“Before the McFadden Act, some states allowed state
banks to open multiple branches, while others prohibited all branching. However, nationally
chartered banks were, in all cases, not allowed to open branches . . . As a result, an increasing
number of national banks gave up their charter . . . .”) (citations omitted).
103

330

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2020

paranoias regarding large financial institutions related to anti-Semitism,
including representative McFadden himself.108 These changes would allow
banks to diversify their geographic risk pools enough to permit later liberal
reform such as the Community Reinvestment Act, which was passed in part
due to the lack of credit provided to underserved communities in certain states
which “prohibited interstate branching or acquisitions and in some cases
restricted even intrastate branching, reducing competition,” and
“contribut[ing] to the perception that banking institutions were failing to
adequately serve the credit needs of some residents of their communities.” 109
It stands to reason that the more we allow states to impede on each other’s
ability to innovate their banking practices and bring those innovations into
the national conversation, the less innovation we will actually see. Section
1044 makes it easier for states to stand in the way of this kind of innovation.
C. State Law is Protected by the Structure of the Federal Government
If we were concerned about the ability of states to influence national
policy at all, then perhaps Section 1044’s preemption provisions would be
warranted, but all the evidence suggests that states are perfectly capable of
influencing the federal consumer finance laws that apply directly to national
banks. The traditional arguments advanced by the Garcia court regarding
states’ abilities to influence national policy apply here.110 While the electoral
college is apportioned to somewhat over-represent states as opposed to

108

McFadden was likely not the only member of Congress whose banking policy was
informed by anti-Semitism, but he may have been the most outspoken. See Congress Acts to
Expunge McFadden Remarks on Jews, JEWISH DAILY BULL., June 2, 1933, at 4 (reporting
on a Congressional motion to expunge anti-Semitic remarks by Representative McFadden,
which included quotations from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in the House of
Representatives). It is no accident that this prejudiced outburst was inspired by the
Congress’s consideration of the United States going off of the gold standard, which occurred
within a week on June 5, 1933. H.R.J. Res. 192, 73rd Cong. (1933).
109
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Rsrv., Speech at the Community Affairs Research
Conference, Washington, D.C.: The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New
Challenges, (Mar. 30, 2007), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke
20070330a.htm [https://perma.cc/KGC3-XCP2].
110
Kramer, supra note 87, at 1488–90. In Garcia, the Supreme Court noted the importance
of the Senate as a political guarantee of State sovereignty.
[The states] were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each State
received equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by the
legislature of his State. The significance attached to the States' equal
representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any
constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation without
the State's consent.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985) (citations omitted).
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people,111 the clearer example of the political safeguards of Federalism is the
Senate, which was famously designed to directly represent state interests. 112
The limitations on federal power that the Garcia court claimed Article I
creates are not relevant here, as bank chartering is a concurrent state and
federal affair. At any rate, as Larry Kramer points out, the interpretation of
Article I as an exclusive list of federal powers has been “obliterated” by the
development of Commerce Clause doctrine since the early 20th Century.113
Still, the disproportionate power that the Senate and the Electoral College
afford to states in the federal government should allow them to influence
federal banking policy such that direct state regulation of nationally chartered
banks is unnecessary.
While the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has arguably
watered down the power that the Senate gives states over national policy, it
has not eliminated it, and a brief survey of the history of bank regulation in
the United States reveals constant allowances for state authority. 114 In
addition to the examples already mentioned, the very structure of the federal
reserve system as established in 1913 reveals compromises for state interests.
In what has come to be known as the Wilsonian Compromise, the Federal
Reserve’s Board of Governors was decentralized in regional reserve banks
and staffed by private bankers from around the country in order to maintain
a “balance of power . . . between local and national figures, much as the U.S.
Constitution had done with states and national governments.”115 The
Consumer Finance Protection Bureau itself, as established under DoddFrank, is proof that states are perfectly capable of establishing national
institutions and laws to ensure that national banks are kept in check and
adequately regulated within the realm of consumer finance and other areas of
financial regulation.
This Congressional respect for the parity of state and national charters
and for state banking regimes generally vindicates “Wechsler’s claim that
states are protected because Congress must overcome a heavy ‘burden of
persuasion’ before displacing state law” even if this belief is not generally
“an important part of the political scene in Washington today.” 116 Even if
there is no presumption against federal intrusion as a political norm in the
111

In that the electoral college apportions electors according to the number of Senate seats
each state has, in addition to the number of representatives to which it is entitled.
112
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 87, at 1489 (“[S]tates have direct control over the Senate
through their equal representation in that body . . . .”).
113
Id. at 1488; cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324–26, 424 (1819)
(finding that the necessary and proper clause authorizes the creation of a national bank).
114
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (ending the direct election of Senators).
115
See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing the motivating principles behind the
unique structure of the federal reserve).
116
Kramer, supra note 87, at 1505.
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modern Congress, in the realm of banking policy, it seems that there truly is
a “local sensitivity to central intervention” as Wechsler suggested was
necessary to protect our Federalism. 117 Even if our administrative agencies,
such as the OCC, are not interested in preserving state consumer finance laws,
there is nothing stopping Congress from passing its own which apply to
national banks, as it has in the recent past. This approach would also likely
result in more effective financial regulation, as “not all state agencies have
experience with such large and complex institutions” like those which
commonly acquire federal charters. 118
D. States Possess Institutional Power over Federal Regulators
Another important check that states can rely on in order to establish
their preferred consumer protection regime is the highly integrated nature of
our banking regulatory system. In fact, federal regulators, and especially
FDIC supervisors, who conduct regular “examinations”119 of all state and
federal FDIC insured banks rely on state regulators for large amounts of
financial information. Bank examination is a specialized form of regulation
in which examiners review the financial data of a bank on a regular basis in
order to assess its “safety and soundness,” which refers to the general health
of the institution in question.120 Federal examiners take examination data and
generate what is referred to as a “CAMELS” rating, which assesses certain
objective factors, like capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings levels and
adequacy, liquidity adequacy, and sensitivity to market risk, as well as
subjective information such as management capability, which relates to
whether the bank’s management makes sound decisions and operates their
bank in a way which ensures “safety and soundness.”121 CAMELS ratings are
117

Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 547 (1954).
118
Schroeder, supra note 40, at 202.
119
For insight on the examination process from the FDIC’s perspective, see generally Bank
Examinations, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/ [https://perma.cc/5N
BA-6G5G] (last updated Oct. 19, 2020).
120
See generally Safety & Soundness Supervision, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/bank-supervision/supervision-and-regulation/safety-soundnesssupervision [https://perma.cc/9TML-9MUD] (providing an overview of the goals of
examination); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., DIV. OF SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION, COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL 3 (2020), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/publications/files/cbem.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YMY-VZZP] (defining safety
and soundness as “including assessing risk-management systems and financial condition as
well as determining compliance with laws and regulations”).
121
See id. at 7 (describing the six components of the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating
System, or “CAMELS” system). For a succinct summary of the Uniform Financial
Institutions Rating System and the consequences of adverse CAMELS ratings, see Julie
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extremely meaningful to banks and other depository institutions, as they
influence the premium that must be paid for deposit insurance, change the
relative likelihood of facing sanctions from supervisors, and affect banks’
ability to expand or hire officers and directors. 122 And importantly, adverse
CAMELS ratings are ordinarily not eligible for judicial review, but are
instead subject to limited internal appeals processes which vary by
regulator.123 Indeed, some banks never receive any potential to appeal
because the consequence of receiving a significantly adverse CAMELS
rating may be swift involuntary receivership by the FDIC and liquidation. 124
Especially since the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of
1950, the FDIC and other federal regulators have relied on state agencies for
the information that they use to generate CAMELS reports, putting them in a
“crucial role in administering federal law,” especially with regards to the
determination of subjective management factors. 125 Section 10(d)(9) of the
FDI Act effectively mandates the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council to reduce the extent to which federal supervisors engage in
duplicative, costly examinations, and instead instructs federal and state
banking agencies to work together in numerous areas, including:
Conducting alternate, joint, and concurrent examinations of
insured depository institutions, and of the branches and
agencies of foreign banks that have been chartered by the
states; Processing safety and soundness examination reports
and applications on a timely basis; Using common
examination report and application forms; Developing and
issuing informal (e.g., board resolutions, memoranda of
Andersen Hill, When Bank Examiners Get it Wrong: Financial Institution Appeals of
Material Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101, 1107–11 (2015) and
accompanying footnotes.
122
Id. at 1108–09.
123
12 U.S.C. § 4806(f); see also Hill, supra note 121, at 1115–60 (discussing the history and
nature of OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and NCUA material supervisory determinations
appeals processes).
124
But see Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that CAMELS ratings
are not beyond judicial review, and disclosing Builders Bank’s CAMELS rating); Nikhil Gore,
Seventh Circuit Holds Open a Narrow Path for Challenging Bank Supervisory Ratings,
COVINGTON, (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.covfinancialservices.com/2017/02/seventh- circuitholds-open-a-narrow-path-for-challenging-bank-supervisory-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/7RBNKR77] (discussing the promise that Builders Bank holds for the judicial review of CAMELS
ratings). The vast majority of bank liquidations make judicial review of CAMELS ratings
impossible. Id. Even Builders Bank did not survive long enough to finish its appeal. Builders
NAB LLC v. FDIC, 922 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Before the case could be resolved
on remand, however, Builders Bank merged into a non-bank enterprise, Builders NAB LLC,
and left the banking business.”).
125
See Gerken, supra note 103, at 1903 (discussing the leverage that states and local actors
gain over the Federal government by being administrators of federal law).
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understanding or other similar agreements) and formal
enforcement actions; Exchanging supervisory information;
Offering federal agency training programs to state examiners;
and Providing access to the federal agency databases.126
This allows state banking agencies to influence federal CAMELS
ratings for all banks within their jurisdiction, turning “dissenters into
decisionmakers, not just lobbyists or supplicants,” and allowing them to “set
policy rather than merely complain about it.” 127 Unfortunately due to the
immense secrecy surrounding supervisory information,128 it is hard to say
how much state supervisory data has actually influenced federal examination
policy, but it is clearly possible for states to adjust the way in which they
report managerial competency to the FDIC, using their own standards and
language, in order to increase or decrease the scrutiny that certain lending
practices or national banking institutions face. 129
This “power of the servant” is endowed in state banking agencies
simply by virtue of the immense difficulty of accumulating supervisory
information. As with other areas of federal policy mandates, the federal
government must rely on states to get the job of FDIC supervision done,
which grants states “leverage” and “discretion in choosing how to accomplish
[their] tasks.”130 And the fact that CAMELS ratings are effectively
unreviewable by courts means that these state-influenced determinations
would have immense staying power pending some costly federal change in
examination policy.

126

FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RMS MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, at 1.1-11, https://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FVA-EWXH].
127
Gerken, supra note 103, at 1903.
128
For a comprehensive discussion of the great lengths to which federal regulators go in
order to keep supervisory information confidential, see Margaret E. Tahyar, Are Bank
Regulators Special?, CLEARING HOUSE: BANK POLICY INSTITUTE, https://www.
theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2018/2018-q1-banking-perspectives/articles/
are-bank-regulators-special [https://perma.cc/5S94-Q5CC] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
129
We know at least that state banking agencies are represented on the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council through the State Liaison Committee, whose chairman is a
voting member of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. State
Representation in Federal Agencies, CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS, (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.csbs.org/state-representation-federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/JM3C-8TH2].
This means that States have some formal voting power to influence “uniform principles, standards,
and report forms for the federal examination of financial institutions.” About the FFIEC, FED. FIN.
INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, (Apr. 15, 2020, 11:10 AM), https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z7MR-7PZY].
130
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1266 (2009).
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Additionally, because state regulators serve “two masters,” and one
could argue they more directly serve their state constituencies,131 they are not
directly accountable to federal banking agencies that might object to the way
in which this data is collected. 132
Another example of regulatory integration serving as a source of state
power that renders Section 1044’s preemption provisions unnecessary comes
from within Dodd-Frank itself. Since the inception of Dodd-Frank, the CFPB
has presented itself as an ally to state attorneys general in the fight against
predatory lending. In an address to the National Association of Attorneys
General in March of 2011, the first official director of the CFPB, Richard
Cordray, stated that the CFPB was “committed to building a strong
partnership” with state attorneys general.133 Part of the motivation for this
alliance stemmed from the shared policy objectives of the CFPB and state
attorneys general, as well as the limited resources of the CFPB, but it also
followed from a recognition of the expertise of state attorneys general in areas
where Cordray noted that they had “preceded” the CFPB.134 Simply put, state
attorneys general had been at the task of consumer finance protection for much
longer than the CFPB had. Ultimately, consumer finance regulation is a
national effort. Loans originated in Montana end up in collateralized debt
obligations in Manhattan, and the federal government must rely on
partnerships with state attorneys general to enforce federal banking policy.
An early example of this kind of cooperation occurred while Elizabeth
Warren was still acting head of the CFPB. In a report to state attorneys
131

One particularly interesting example of state bank agencies flouting federal law to serve
the interests of their constituencies is the tolerance of marijuana banking in jurisdictions that
have legalized the substance at the state level. See Colorado Banks Quietly Serving Cannabis
Industry, INS. J. (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2019/10/04/
544488.htm [https://perma.cc/HY67-HMHN] (noting that at least “35 banks and credit
unions” served marijuana businesses from 2014 to 2019); Jesse Paul, Colorado’s Top
Federal Prosecutor Says Banks Working with Marijuana Industry Have “No Carve Out”
From Prosecutions, COLO. SUN (Oct. 2, 2019, 5:00 AM) https://coloradosun.com/2019/10/
02/marijuana-banking-federal-prosecution-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/K3NC-MZSD] (suggesting
that federal prosecutors are well aware of the illegality of these operations); see also Tom Angell,
State Financial Regulators Press Congress to Allow Marijuana Banking Access, FORBES (Apr.
16, 2019, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2019/04/16/state-financial-reg
ulators-press-congress-to-allow-marijuana-banking-access/#13625ce055c9 [https://perma.cc/
6GGB-4YTL] (reporting on some bank regulators’ efforts to secure congressional approval
of marijuana banking).
132
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 130, at 1270–71.
133
Richard Cordray, Remarks at the National Association of Attorneys General Spring
Meeting: Partnering: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and State Attorneys
General (Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/partneringthe-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-state-attorneys-general/ [https://perma.cc/
SAC5-36Y9].
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general, the CFPB’s Consumer Bureau announced that the country’s “five
largest mortgage firms . . . saved more than $20 billion since the housing
crisis began in 2007 by taking shortcuts in processing troubled borrowers’
home loans.”135 While this report clearly serves as an example of the
willingness of the CFPB to work with state agencies, at the time it also
worried lawmakers who were threatened by the apparent “link between the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, led by [then] Harvard professor
Elizabeth Warren, and the 50 state attorneys general who [were] leading the
nationwide probe into the five firms’ improper foreclosure practices.” 136 The
fledgling agency at that time had already begun to provide “advice” to
attorneys general who were contemplating settlements with those mortgage
firms, which speaks to a deep connection between the law enforcement
capacity of state Attorneys General and the new federal consumer finance
protection regime.137
Of course, there is always the risk that a national administration
hostile to the interests of consumer finance protection will take office and
reduce the effectiveness of federal consumer financial protection laws. The
Trump administration has done exactly this.138 But we must remember that
Federalism is a politically neutral principle of American government. Even
in times in which the federal government opposes their interest in national
consumer finance policy, states may use federal reliance on their cooperation
with the CFPB to influence federal policy. And even if they lack any
productive relationship with federal regulators, states still do not need
protection from preemption under Section 1044 because of the integration of
state and federal agencies through bank supervision, and the inherent power
of Congress to ratchet up regulations for nationally chartered banks.

135

Shahien Nasiripour, Big Banks Save Billions as Homeowners Suffer, Internal Federal
Report by CFPB Finds, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bigbanks-save-billions-homeowners-suffer_n_841712 [https://perma.cc/82UL-MHKP].
136
Id.
137
Id. Then-Professor Warren was forced to admit “under intense questioning” by the House
Financial Services Committee that this advice had been given. Id. This episode suggests that
the CFPB may prove an ally to state attorneys general even in spite of federal opposition.
138
See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fed’n Am., CFPB Law Enforcement Plummets Under
Trump Administration, (Mar. 11, 2019), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/16137/
[https://perma.cc/SA4E-BPGD] (noting that the decline in enforcement activity was most
clear “in the areas where the volume of consumer complaints received by the CFPB is the
highest”); CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N AM., DORMANT: THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE 3 (2019),
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FZ8-YP8B] (finding that “[t]he average amount of monetary relief per
case awarded to victims of illegal consumer financial practices has declined by
approximately 96%” since 2015).
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E. States Retain Regulatory Power through Localist Preferences
Additionally, state charters retain some regulatory sway even in the
face of aggressive federal preemption through nationally chartered banks.
There is a reason why state banks greatly outnumber national banks, and why
early state reforms like mandatory deposit insurance were able to be pursued
without state banks overwhelmingly switching to national charters. 139
Ultimately, “some bankers prefer a more provincial regulatory approach,
expecting local regulators to be more sympathetic to, and familiar with, local
economic issues and idiosyncrasies.” 140 Some might discard this sentiment
as endorsing nepotism, 141 but it is indisputable that some state-chartered
banks prefer their local regulators to federal alternatives whether that be
because of institutional ties, or in some cases, lax regulation. 142 The many
instances of lax regulation by state regulators in an attempt to capture banks
may give pause to some who ardently support state regulators over their
federal counterparts, but it is also true that some banks may simply “desire to
work with a local regulatory presence” whose regulatory regime is apt for the
structure or location of their bank. 143
For many banks, holding onto a state charter or switching from a
national charter may also help them avoid “significantly higher regulatory
and examination fees,” in addition to granting them access to favorable local
laws and “local access to their primary regulators.”144 This is especially true
as the OCC has suffered from increased turnover in recent years which makes
building a productive regulatory relationship difficult for many nationally
chartered banks.145
Whatever the exact cause of some banks’ preference for state
regulators may be, it grants states some residual power to regulate according
See, e.g., White, supra note 104, at 537 (discussing states’ pioneering of deposit insurance).
Schroeder, supra note 40, at 202.
141
It is easy to follow the implication that state regulators will go too easy on banks chartered
in their home state due to favoritism and competition for charters, thus compromising the
integrity of our financial system.
142
For an example of state supervision getting too lax, see Texas Bank Insider Abuse, Lax
Oversight by Directors, Led to First Failure in 18 Months; More Review Needed, REG. REP.
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.regreport.info/2019/09/26/texas-bank-insider-abuse-lax-over
sight-by-directors-led-to-first-failure-in-18-months/ [https://perma.cc/7576-FR6D]. See also
Kevin Wack, Regulatory Competition is Hot Again — and That’s Worrisome, AM. BANKER,
(Jan. 6, 2019, 10:00 PM) https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulatory-competition-ishot-again-and-thats-worrisome [https://perma.cc/RL6B-M7JG] (providing an overview of
the hazards of regulatory competition, including the potential for lax supervision).
143
Schroeder, supra note 40, at 222.
144
John Reichert & Jim Sheriff, Weighing the Benefits of a State Charter, BANK DIRECTOR
(Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.bankdirector.com/issues/regulation/weighing-benefits-statecharter/ [https://perma.cc/CE3Q-ZCPM].
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to their consumer finance protection preferences, at least with respect to
banks which possess state charters who are unable to preempt relevant state
law. Of course, this space for legislation and regulation is limited by the
degree to which state-chartered banks prefer state regulators to national
regulators because the option to convert to a federal charter is generally open
to them.146 At some threshold of state regulatory intervention, they would
make the decision to switch, which is why it is fortunate that states have also
been uniquely successful in implementing banking policy at the federal level.
IV. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST CONSEQUENCES OF SKIDMORE REVIEW
Besides substantively changing the kind of state laws that were
eligible for preemption by federal bank regulation under the National Bank
Act and the Federal Reserve Act, Section 1044 also prescribes a standard of
review for courts to use when “reviewing any determinations made by the
Comptroller regarding preemption of a State law.” 147 This change offends the
principles of our Dual Banking system and works against the Federalism
benefits it ostensibly promotes because it encourages judicial
policymaking148 within arbitrary federal circuit divisions and does not respect
the Presidency as an instrument of federal policymaking.149 More generally,
the Skidmore command under Section 1044 is unnecessary because
traditional interpretive canons regarding preemption are sufficient to
safeguard state interests.150
In order to grasp the Federalism consequences of discarding Chevron
deference for OCC preemption determinations under Section 1044 of DoddFrank, it is important to note exactly what Skidmore deference is. When
exercising Chevron deference, a court is not responsible for determining
whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct as a matter of law.
Instead, the question is whether an agency’s interpretation is “based on a
permissible construction of the statute” in question.151 Where Congress has
spoken to the issue in question, that is the only reasonable interpretation, but
where “Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision
146
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of the statute by regulation.”152 In effect, Chevron allows Congress to
delegate rulemaking authority to agencies, including the OCC (except as
prohibited by section 1044), within a range of reasonable interpretations of
the statutes they are entrusted to administer.
Prior to Chevron,153 administrative interpretations were granted what
is now referred to as Skidmore deference, which is not based on any express
or implied delegation of rulemaking authority by Congress to an agency.
Instead, it is based solely on an agency’s expertise over the matter in question,
which entitles the agency’s interpretation to deference according to the
“thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade.” 154 Some commentators suggest that
Skidmore deference is in fact not a kind of deference at all, because the
Skidmore factors only grant agency interpretations the respect that would
follow from any generic legal position that is validly reasoned and
persuasive.155 As the late Justice Scalia put it, “the rule of Skidmore deference
is an empty truism and a trifling statement of the obvious: A judge should
take into account the well-considered views of expert observers.”156
The policy reasons that motivated the Dodd-Frank congress to create
Section 1044’s Skidmore provision are self-evident, “in light of the OCC’s
history of controversial preemption decisions based on conflict-of-interest
and regulatory-capture concerns.”157 By limiting the amount of deference
OCC preemption determinations were given, Congress hoped to limit the
degree to which these preemption determinations are successful, but in the
process it discarded important Federalism interests without any guaranteed
benefits to state consumer finance protection law.
A. Judicial Policymaking
For the same reasons that the Supreme Court has turned away from
judicial “line-drawing of the most arbitrary sort” for defining traditional state
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Id. at 843–44.
But see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (holding that Skidmore
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155
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functions immune from federal regulation, Congress should not entrust
preemption determinations to courts under Skidmore deference.158
First, Skidmore deference invites judicial policy making on issues of
immense national importance involving the operation of our national banking
system. Judges are rarely trained economists, and in the words of Larry
Kramer, they “lack the resources, know-how, and flexibility to make
dependable decisions about the level at which to govern in today’s complex
and rapidly evolving world.”159 Because of this relative lack of economic and
policy training, it is hard to see how most judges could make informed
decisions about which state banking laws are worthy of preemption. The
more likely outcome would be arbitrary judicial line drawing inevitably
informed by judges’ subconscious policy preferences. 160 Delegating
important questions of consumer finance and banking efficiency to untrained
judges also destroys the discursive process of federal and state banking
innovation that has led to so many previously mentioned innovations in our
financial sector.161
Skidmore deference as applied to preemption decisions under Section
1044 is also less democratic. Whatever state of financial regulation that state
and federal agencies arrive at through the political safeguards of Federalism
and deliberation at all levels of government should be left as is without
unelected judges influencing national policy. It also does not necessarily
follow that entrusting preemption decisions to judges will actually result in
less harsh forms of preemption. The implicit biases of judges who are hostile
to states with comprehensive consumer finance protection laws may be more
likely to preempt state laws, in which case all that the Skidmore provision of
Section 1044 does is insulate from later judicial review the administrative
interpretations of judges who reach each preemption question first.
Additionally, the use of Skidmore deference under Section 1044 will
ultimately lead to more circuit splits. Because an administrative interpretation
decided under Skidmore must be decided as a matter of law, “beyond the
power of the agency to change even through rulemaking,” 162 every OCC
preemption rulemaking regarding consumer finance protection law that
reaches judicial review is more likely to be decided differently by each
158
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federal circuit.163 This means that the effect of Section 1044 on state law will
differ by circuit across the country until the Supreme Court grants cert to
resolve all of these questions, as with Madden v. Midland Funding,164 or more
recently, Lusnak v. Bank of America, in which the Ninth Circuit held that the
areas of state law the OCC says are presumed to be preempted per 12 C.F.R.
§§ 7.4008 and 34.4 carry no weight in the judicial determination of
preemption issues under Dodd-Frank.165
These circuit splits may become a headache for the OCC and
nationally chartered banks, but more importantly they divide the country into
areas in which law applies differently without any of the attending benefits
that a federalist regime offers. We tolerate states with different laws in order
to “give[] democracy’s outliers the same opportunities that members of the
majority routinely enjoy,”166 i.e. their own preferred policies, or to facilitate
a “national conversation” on divisive subjects through “a variety of local
ones,”167 or to encourage innovation and experimentation, but circuit splits
provide none of these benefits in a way that is amenable to our democratic
process. The banking law that Section 1044’s Skidmore provision will assign
to each federal circuit will be inevitably random, such that the citizens within
these circuits will not be invested in the smorgasbord of policy that they end
up with. And more troublingly, this “ossification” 168 of preemption under
Dodd-Frank means that the OCC will be powerless to change policy in the
event of systematic financial distress. It is hard to imagine an area of policy
besides national security that demands more immediate flexibility in times of
crisis than financial regulation.
B. Federalist Policymaking from the Presidency
In fact, proponents of Federalism in America should embrace
Chevron for preemption questions with open arms, including in the area of
banking regulation. This is because the executive branch, which ultimately
guides agency action, is well suited for the task of resolving federalist
preemption disputes. As Herbert Wechsler stated, “the prime organ of a . . .
Unlike under Chevron deference, in which circuits must only agree that an agency’s
administrative interpretation is reasonable, under Skidmore, each circuit must independently
arrive at the same interpretation of a given statute to create a cohesive national policy.
164
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‘national spirit’ is, of course, the President—both as the Chief Executive and
as the leader of his party.”169 As Wechsler argued, this position comes from
the structure of the electoral college, which is largely populated by adding
the number of seats in the Senate and the House together, resulting in a blend
of state and purely federal interests.170 In other words, the presidency must
be won by a federalist coalition of electors.
In this respect, the President is a better candidate to resolve questions
of administrative interpretation in a way which honors the interests of states
and the national government than an unelected judge, who may err in favor
of their “personal policy preferences.”171 Additionally, in the words of Elena
Kagan, “presidential leadership enhances transparency, enabling the public
to comprehend more accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic
power.”172 This serves the Federalism interest inherent in democratic
accountability. By entrusting all OCC preemption choices to the OCC itself,
as influenced by Presidential policy, Congress could make the respective
sources of federal and state banking policy clearer to the public. More
concretely, Justice Kagan has noted that “presidential leadership establishes
an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter's
responsiveness to the former.”173 This “electoral link” is particularly important
in order to translate public knowledge of federal versus state policy into actual
electoral outcomes at the state and federal level in order to make the discursive
benefits of Federalism real.174 All of this is especially true today given the
heightened impact that Presidents have on agency policy since the advent of
Office of Management and Budget regulatory review, which allows
Presidents to inject themselves into the rulemaking process in order to guide
agency policy directly at the national level.175
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C. Traditional Preemption Principles Protect against Undue Preemption
Section 1044’s Skidmore command is also unnecessary because
traditional preemption principles are sufficient to guard against unwarranted
intrusions into state law. While some scholars “have argued that granting
Chevron deference to agency interpretations regarding preemption is
inappropriate” because it would put Federalism questions in the hands of
unelected agency officials,176 there is little constitutional muster in this
sentiment. The Supremacy Clause clearly states that “[t]his Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” 177 When Congress leaves “a gap for
the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”178 In other words,
a regulation promulgated by an administrative agency within the reasonable
bounds of a delegation of authority from Congress really is law for purposes
of the Supremacy Clause. Chevron deference is more than an interpretive
rule, it is a recognition that Congress makes certain laws which it “entrusted”
agencies “to administer.”179 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has failed to
outright endorse Chevron deference in preemption determinations by federal
agencies, sometimes being “quite deferential” and other times being “almost
entirely nondeferential.”180 Most recently, in Coventry Health Care of Missouri,
Inc. v. Nevils, the Supreme Court once again sidestepped the question.181
The constitutional basis of Chevron deference is a Congressional
delegation of authority, and in a preemption context, courts are more than
capable of determining where an agency exceeded the reasonable bounds of
a Congressional delegation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. is a good
176
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example of this kind of interpretive framework, although it was a pre-Chevron
holding.182 In Rice, the Supreme Court held that because in regulating warehouse
licenses, Congress had entered a “field which the States have traditionally
occupied,” it would begin its preemption analysis “with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”183
In effect, this kind of interpretive clear statement rule could inform
Chevron analysis as applied to the preemption of state consumer financial
protection laws, perhaps narrowing the range of preemptive interpretations
that the OCC could argue were reasonable given the history and purpose of
the National Banking Act. This recognition that Congress does not generally
intend to supplant state law would hedge against wanton preemption while
honoring the foundation of Chevron deference, which is Congress’s intent
with respect to a statute’s meaning.
At the very least, a more comprehensive and consistent national
banking system would follow. And most importantly, those who object to
OCC preemption rulemakings could always petition Congress to make new
law affecting nationally chartered banks.
CONCLUSION
Section 1044 represents a bold statement of Congressional preference
for more consumer finance regulation following the 2008 financial crisis. By
curtailing the power of federal banking agencies like the Office of the
Comptroller to preempt state banking laws, Dodd-Frank sought to leave more
of these laws in place to guard against the imprudent consumer lending that
was thought to have contributed to the crisis. 184 Regardless of whether you
believe more consumer protection laws would improve the financial stability
of our banking system or not, this paper has argued that any banking reforms
should be made within the confines of our Dual Banking system to secure
important Federalism benefits. Ultimately this means that if more consumer
protection is warranted for lending performed by national banks, it should
come from federal law, not state regulators.
In order to secure Federalism values such as democratic
accountability, policy innovation, and political transparency, our Dual
Banking regime must be protected through preemption of state banking
regulations for nationally chartered banks under deferential Chevron review.
182
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Section 1044 undermines these interests to little or no benefit to consumer
protection given the historical success of banks in securing protective federal
policy, integrating their supervisory regulators with the Federal supervision
system, and partnering with federal consumer finance protection agencies.
Where these measures fail, states can still rely on the residual local
attractiveness of their charters to entice banks to operate under their
regulatory purview, as well as the interpretive canons that inform Chevron
review in the federal court system.
The ultimate proof of concept for this model of regulation lies within
Dodd-Frank itself in the establishment of the Consumer Finance Protection
Bureau, which has the power to issue substantive rulemakings to prohibit
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices related to mortgages, credit
cards, and other forms of consumer finance. 185 Covered persons under the
CFPB’s broad regulatory jurisdiction include any entities and their service
providers who offer or provide any “consumer financial product or service,”
with few carve outs.186 Importantly, the CFPB not only has rulemaking
authority, but also enforcement power and even supervisory authority over
banks and non-bank institutions.187 And while its leadership structure may
have been struck down this year, the CFPB’s mandate continues with the
Supreme Court’s blessing as living proof that Congress can act aggressively
to regulate national banks and their lending practices directly. 188 Instead of
abandoning our Dual Banking system, future consumer finance protection
reform should follow in the CFPB’s footsteps by ensuring that national banks
play by federal rules. In the words of now Senator Warren, “[t]he problem is
not in the federal preemption; it is in the failure of federal law to offer a
suitable alternative to the preempted state law.” 189
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